How Does the War End? A Single Scenario from Russian Economist Inozemtsev

Russian opposition economist Vladislav Inozemtsev assesses that economic hardships alone will not be enough for the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine. It is noted that despite the heavy economic pressures, sanctions, and global isolation coming from both within and outside Russia, the Moscow administration has no intention of halting its military operations. According to Inozemtsev, the financial and commercial collapse has turned into a stress that causes the Russian people and the state to make more sacrifices, rather than being a reason that will end the war. In other words, the deterioration in economic indicators does not create a breaking point that would cause the current political power to compromise on its strategic goals. This situation largely weakens hopes that the war will end in the near future due to financial reasons.

The most critical point emphasized by the economist is that the war can only stop if there are mass social protests or if a segment of the Russian elite openly stands against the government. A broad section of society taking to the streets and showing a united reaction against the current political system could be perceived as a truly existential threat by the Kremlin. Similarly, the dissatisfaction of the business world and political elites, who hold key roles in the functioning of the state and wealth distribution, is shown among the only internal dynamics that could create pressure on the current leadership. However, Inozemtsev also preemptively adds that the probability of this scenario occurring under current conditions is extremely low. Because so far, neither a mass popular uprising has broken out, nor has a significant portion of the elites broken their silence to oppose the war.

In addition to this, Russia's continuous revitalization of its war industry and the increase in state-backed spending act as a shock absorber that delays an economic collapse in the short term. While this record increase in military spending temporarily supports employment, it deepens the structural problems of the country's economy in the long run. The shifting of production resources from the civilian sector to the military sector gradually lowers the living standards of the population, but this has not yet created an outburst of anger that reflects on the streets and would be at a level to overthrow the administration. Authorities continue to use their media tools to the fullest to suppress economic hardships and manage social discontent. Therefore, the attrition caused by the war economy has turned into a process of resistance without alternatives, where society grows even more exhausted, rather than a crisis that would topple the regime.

While the international community and Western observers closely follow domestic political and economic developments in Russia, they appear to maintain a cautious optimism regarding the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Ukraine. However, the impact of Western-backed sanctions on Russia remaining slower and more limited than expected has pushed decision-makers to seek new strategies. Inozemtsev's analyses strikingly reveal that Russia cannot be brought to its knees solely by external economic pressures, and that regime opposition and public resistance inside the country are also mandatory in this equation. In this context, the strength of Russia's autocratic structure and its capacity to suppress protests remain the hidden keys that will determine the course of the war. Considering the Kremlin's harsh domestic policy, the transformation of economic hardships into a rebellion carries great uncertainty.

In conclusion, the assessments of the Russian opposition economist show that there is no concrete and convincing scenario yet for ending the war in Ukraine in the short and medium term. The stable and relatively controllable domestic political environment that has persisted since the beginning of the war continues to act as a shield against economic turmoil. Predicting when and how the war's grueling impact on Russian society and elites will reach a breaking point is extremely difficult. However, if one thing is certain, it is that internal pressure must become much more intense and organized for the Kremlin to abandon its military objectives. Otherwise, the current status quo and low-intensity attrition carry the risk of continuing to have regional and global impacts for many more years to come.