25 Million Razor Wire on Tai Dağı: The Illusion of 'Project Economics' in Çin

Çin's sacred Tai Dağı (Taishan) scenic area has built a barrier made of razor wire, exactly 135 kilometers long, to prevent visitors from entering illegally. This massive project was realized through the expenditure of approximately 25 million yuan (about 3.5 million dollars) in public funds. On online platforms, users mockingly referred to it as the "Çin-Tayland border" due to its terrifying appearance and excessive engineering. Writer Liu Yuanju evaluates this situation not merely as an environmental or security issue, but as a typical example of a much deeper structural problem regarding how public finance operates in Çin. The incident is being discussed not as a simple security measure, but as one of the consequences of a systematic project-creation culture that public institutions resort to in order to grow their budgets.

The author criticizes many critics for putting forward idealist arguments, such as that tai Dağı should belong to the public and be open for free access. Although in history famous poets and explorers freely roamed these mountains, in the modern world, operating a massive tourist area has enormous costs. Factors such as road maintenance, security systems, cable car infrastructure, the maintenance of electricity and communication lines, waste management, and environmental protection require serious investment. Therefore, charging visitors an entrance fee to finance these services is an extremely logical and justified practice. Consequently, the core of the problem is not whether the mountain belongs to the public or whether a fee should be charged; the real issue is how, why, and with what efficiency these collected fees and public resources are spent.

Looking at it from a mathematical and practical perspective, this 25 million yuan wire fence project is a complete economic fiasco. Considering that in 2025 approximately 8 million people entered the mountain and the total ticket revenue obtained was 630 million yuan, the number of people entering illegally is around 16,000 to 18,000. This means that even if this is prevented by erecting wire fences, the amount saved is only around 1.4 million yuan. Even if maintenance costs are disregarded, it will take 17 years for this massive investment to pay for itself. Moreover, since these wire fences are galvanized metal rather than stainless steel, they will rust and lose their function within a few years under the harsh weather conditions of the mountain. When needed, this system, which is so vulnerable that it can be cut with simple scissors, is a completely unnecessary and wasteful expenditure that does not serve the purpose for which it was built.

Right at this point, a Çin-specific public finance disease, which the author calls "project science" or "project economics," comes into play. If a private company or an individual operator were in the same situation, they would conduct a cost-benefit analysis and never undertake such a meaningless investment; because for the private sector, illogical expenditures are not made. However, when it is a public institution affiliated with the state or local governments, things change. In public administration, the main goal is not to achieve efficiency or profit, but often to grow the institution's budget, generate new projects, and demonstrate existence by making expenditures through legitimate means. Even if the managers of the tourist area increased the number of visitors and revenue tenfold through promotion, they could not directly receive a share of this profit as a bonus or high salary for themselves or their employees. However, when an expenditure of 25 million yuan is issued as a "security project" for the institution, this opens new doors for bureaucratic expansion, contract distribution, and institutional power.

As a result, the failure to prevent such wasteful "project science" cases is a natural consequence of the lack of systematic oversight and the bureaucratic structure. Transparent tender processes, independent audit mechanisms, and strong public scrutiny can undoubtedly play a critical role in preventing such foolish projects. However, the author argues that at the root of this problem lies a deep misconception the public holds regarding the ownership of massive natural assets. With the belief that "the mountains belong to all the people," individuals strongly oppose the privatization of these areas or the transfer of their operating rights. Yet, this sense of "ownership" held in the hands of the public not only provides no economic benefit to individuals in practice, but also opens the door to massive resource waste, as exemplified above. If these areas had been transferred to institutions managed with a truly commercial mindset and a strict sense of responsibility, today there would not be a 135-kilometer series of razor wire left to rust on the slopes of the mountain.