European-made microchips continue to power Russia's lethal drones

STM32 microcontroller chips manufactured by the Switzerland-based STMicroelectronics continue to appear in the lethal drones Russia uses against Ukraine. In May 2026, Ukrainian intelligence recovered these chips from inside a downed Geran-4 drone, revealing the true scale of the situation. Up until that date, in a database maintained by Ukraine, STMicroelectronics parts were encountered a total of 270 times across Russian drones, missiles, and various warfare systems. This figure is twice the number of chips from any other European manufacturer listed in the same database. Despite the comprehensive sanctions imposed by Western countries, preventing this technology from reaching the battlefield appears to be extremely difficult.

The process of these European-made chips reaching Russia takes place through a complex and multi-layered Chinese supply chain. Avnet, a Phoenix-based distribution company and an important business partner of STMicroelectronics, sells these chips to Chinese manufacturers. Avnet's Hong Kong subsidiary sold these microchips in increasingly large quantities to a Chinese drone propulsion system manufacturer named Shenzhen Hobbywing Technology. Hobbywing's purchases from this subsidiary jumped from approximately 400.000 dollars in 2024 to 1.95 million dollars in 2025. The growth of this commercial volume clearly demonstrates how components classified as civilian can be used for military purposes.

In the subsequent stage of the supply chain, Hobbywing sells the electronic speed controllers it manufactures using these chips to Nanchang Sanrui Intelligence Technology, the company that owns the T-Motor brand. The Sanrui company officially announced that it purchased 7 million dollars worth of controllers from Hobbywing in just the first half of 2025. Jiangxi Xintuo, a subsidiary of Sanrui, was blacklisted by Washington on the grounds that it supports Russia's military activities. Trade records confirm that Xintuo later sent T-Motor products to at least six different Russian buyers who were subsequently subjected to sanctions. Experts researching Russian military technologies state that the Beijing administration plays a critical role in Moscow's circumvention of sanctions.

Sanctions and trade restrictions are unfortunately proving inadequate even in slowing down the flow of this lethal supply chain. Although Western countries have imposed export restrictions on Xintuo and Sanrui, both companies have managed to adapt to the situation rapidly. Sanrui's recent legal filings indicate that the company has found new trade partners and conducts its export operations through Eastern European networks. A website linked to the sanctioned Xintuo continues to sell T-Motor products globally and even accepts payments via major credit cards. Tracking these dual-use technologies is legally and technically highly challenging, as the components are repurposed into new products.

Experts emphasize that China's massive civilian drone industry is inherently dual-use, and that dismantling this structure through sanctions is almost impossible. Lilly Lee, a researcher at the DSET think tank in Taiwan, states that the primary goal is not only to produce Chinese drones, but also to strengthen this system with real feedback from the battlefield. Such robust civilian trade networks between China and Russia can sustain military applications for extended periods, even in the absence of any official government cooperation. These dynamics lay bare why Western authorities struggle so profoundly to completely sever the supply chain. This technological flow, which directly impacts the course of the war, also painfully exposes the limitations of international oversight mechanisms.